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Abstract Ockham defines intuition as the kind of cogni-
tion on the basis of which it is not only possible to evi-
dently judge that a thing exists when it exists, but also that
a thing does not exist when it does not exist. He makes a
further distinction between natural intuition and supernat-
ural intuition. The aim of this paper is to determine what,
according to Ockham, can be judged evidently by means of
natural intuition and what can only be judged evidently by
means of supernatural intuition. It is commonly assumed
that by natural intuition we can make only affirmative
judgements, whereas by supernatural intuition we can
make both affirmative and negative judgements. The paper
shows that this way of contrasting the two is mistaken. The
paper argues instead that also natural intuition, according
to Ockham, enables us to make both affirmative and neg-
ative judgements.
Keywords Intuition of non-existents  Evident judgement 
Divine omnipotence  Existence  Negative judgement
1 Introduction
According to our everyday notions, we can acquire beliefs,
and even true ones, about things we perceive. This possi-
bility is not confined to cases where what is believed is
affirmative: seeing a rook on the roof, one can judge, and
hence, come to believe not only that the rook is on the roof,
but also that the rook is not in the tree. One of the
philosopher’s tasks is to give a systematical account of the
relation between perception and the acquisition of (true)
beliefs. The Franciscan William Ockham approaches this
issue in terms of intuitive cognition and evident judge-
ment:1 the former is a kind of (intellectual) perception on
the basis of which one can judge correctly that the thing
‘intuited’ exists or that it is thus-and-so. The idea is that
intuitive cognition, as a non-propositional cognition (par-
tially) causes a propositional act of judging.2
Ockham calls this kind of judgement ‘evident’. By
definition, if an act of judging is evident, then what is
judged is true. According to the Franciscan, what can be
evidently judged can also be negative in form: one can
judge evidently that (a) a thing does not exist or that (b) a
thing is not thus-and-so—by means of intuitive cognition,
or intuition, for short.
Ockham further distinguishes between ‘natural’ and
‘supernatural intuition’, thereby marking a crucial cogni-
tive difference between acts of intuition that obtain by
wholly natural means and those that occur only by divine
intervention. It is commonly assumed in the secondary
literature that by natural intuition we can make only
affirmative judgements, whereas by supernatural intuition
we can make both affirmative and negative judgements.
This view, however, is mistaken, since by natural intuition
we can make both affirmative and negative judgements, or
so the paper argues.
Ockham’s claim concerning the intuition of non-existent
things has provoked a still ongoing debate in medieval
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scholarship centering on his basic attitude towards scepti-
cism. As Panaccio and Piche´ have argued convincingly, the
‘current consensus is that the traditional [sceptical] read-
ings of Ockham in the first half of the twentieth century
were generally misguided on these topics.’3 Panaccio and
Piche´ also defend the possibility of intuition of non-exis-
tents against scepticist interpretations.4 By focussing on
this supernatural intuition of non-existents, however, it is
easily overlooked that within Ockham’s theoretical
framework it is also possible to make certain evident
negative judgements on a wholly natural cognitive basis.
Take the two forms of negative evident judgements that
(a) a thing does not exist or that (b) a thing is not thus-and-
so. These are not on a par with respect to their cognitive
requirements, since (a) requires the supernaturally achieved
intuition of a non-existent thing, whereas (b) does not
involve any supernatural cognition. In this paper, therefore,
I pay special attention to both supernatural and natural
cases where what is judged takes for example the form ‘a is
not F’ or ‘a does not exist’.5
As I see it, the scope of what can be evidently judged by
wholly natural means is restricted to the very presence or
absence of things and their presently being thus-and-so or
not being thus-and-so.6 By contrast, evident judgements
concerning either the mere existence of a thing, where this
existential judgement does not entail any judgement about
the thing’s presence, or the non-existence of a thing are
unattainable without God’s intervention, that is, without
supernaturally induced acts of intuition. Thus it should be
noted that evident judgements can differ with respect to
their scope although they do not differ as to their form.
I proceed as follows: I first discuss Ockham’s paradig-
matic presentation of natural intuition and evident judge-
ment, both affirmative and negative (Sects. 2.1, 2.2
respectively) and then turn to the supernatural cases
(Sects. 3.1, 3.2). Against this background, I finally come to
an assessment of the general relation between the natural
and the supernatural cases of evident judgement (Sect. 4).
2 Intuition and Evident Judgement: The Natural
Paradigm
2.1 The Natural Affirmative Cases
Ockham introduces the possibility of acquiring evident
knowledge that a thing exists along with the possibility of
acquiring evident knowledge that a thing does not exist. He
writes:
[…] the intuitive cognition of a thing is such a cog-
nition by virtue of which it can be known whether a
thing exists or not, such that if the thing exists, the
intellect judges immediately that it exists and evi-
dently recognizes that it exists, […]. And in the same
way, if by divine power such a […] cognition of a
non-existent thing were to be preserved, then by
virtue of this non-complex cognition the intellect
would evidently cognize that this thing does not
exist.7
In the natural course of the world, if a subject has an
intuition of a thing a, then a is the efficient cause of this
act.8 The intuition is ‘proper’ (propria) to the thing that
causes it insofar as an intuition is individuated by its cause.
It is only an intuition of the very thing that causes it, of
nothing else. As Ockham states in an often-quoted passage
in the Quodlibeta:
[Intuitive cognition] is proper to particulars […]
because it is immediately caused by a particular thing
or is apt to be caused, and cannot be caused by
another thing, […].9
3 Panaccio and Piche´ (2010: 98). Such sceptical readings include
Michalsky (1921), Gilson (1937, esp. 61–91), Pegis (1944); early
critics of this sceptical interpretation are Boehner (1943, 1945) and
Day (1947). More recent critics of the sceptical interpretation include
Karger (1999, 2004) and Panaccio and Piche´ (2010).
4 According to Panaccio and Piche´, it can be seen as being more in
line with a strong reliabilist picture involving certain counterfactuals
(Panaccio and Piche´ 2010: 112–116). In this paper, however, my
primary concern is not to add to the project of meeting the sceptical
worries arising from this possibility.
5 I remain silent on the question whether for Ockham accepting
something as true and rejecting something as false are different kinds
of acts or whether the latter act can be reduced to the former. Ockham
presents and discusses his account of judgement, that is, of assent and
dissent in Ockham, Quodlibeta [hereafter: Quodl.] III, q.8 (OTh IX,
232–237); Quodl. V, q.6 (OTh IX, 500–503). Assent corresponds to
the act of accepting something (as true) whereas dissent corresponds
to the act of rejecting something (as false). See Ordinatio [hereafter:
Ord.] I, prol., q.1 (OTh I, 16–18). For discussion of Ockham’s theory
of judgement see Brower-Toland (2007, 2015), Karger (1995),
Panaccio (2009), Schierbaum (2014: 190–202; 203–214).
6 Note that although intuition, due to its specific causal powers, is an
important element of the cognitive basis of natural evident judge-
ments, it does not exhaust this basis. I say more on this basis in
Sect. 2.2.
7 Ord. I, prol., q.1 (OTh 1, 31), (italics mine).
8 Three terminological remarks are in place here. First, throughout
this paper, I shall use ‘act of intuitive cognition’, ‘intuitive act’ and
‘intuition’ interchangeably. So when I speak of an intuition, I thereby
mean an act of intuitive cognition. Second, from now on, when I
speak of a cause tout court, I mean an efficient cause, since in the
present context we are exclusively dealing with efficient causes. For
Ockham’s conception of efficient causality see Adams (1987:
741–798). Third, throughout this paper, by ‘judgement’ I refer to
the act of judging, not to what is judged, if not indicated otherwise.
9 Quodl. I, q.13 (OTh IX, 73).
S. Schierbaum
123
Ockham emphasizes that an intuition of a cannot be caused
by a thing b, no matter how much a and b are alike.10 This
illustrates that an intuitive act is exclusively individuated
by its cause. It also gives us the following sufficient
condition for a subject’s intuiting a thing a in the natural
order of things:
(1) If a thing a causes an intuition in a subject S, then S
intuits a.
Now if the subject intuits a, then the subject is in a position
to correctly judge that a exists (a est): that this act of
judging is ‘evident’ means that—by definition—what is
judged is true. Also, Ockham states that ‘the intellect
judges immediately (statim)’. This is to say that intuition-
based thoughts leave no room for lack of truth commit-
ment:11 the subject cannot merely entertain the thought that
a thing exists if he has an intuition of the thing in question.
Note that what can be judged in this way can take dif-
ferent forms. Why? The general idea is that things are
normally not intuited in isolation, or one-by-one, but (a) in
relation to their spatial and temporal position (‘here and
now’) as well as (b) in relation to other things in their
vicinity; analogously, it is not possible to perceive just one
particular thing in total isolation: if two rooks are sitting
next to each other on the roof, then, under normal lightning
conditions etc., I do not only see one of the rooks, but both
of them, together with the things in their surroundings, e.g.,
(part of) the roof. As to (a), even if, say, in an art exhibi-
tion, someone is intuiting only one thing, say, a sculpture in
an otherwise empty room, then he nevertheless intuits the
sculpture in relation to the walls, the floor, in short, with
respect to its position not only in space, but also with
respect to its position in time, that is, as being present (to
him) now. In Ockham’s own words:
I say that the intellect cognizes intuitively particular
things as to here and now and with respect to all
conditions under which the senses cognize […].12
The point is that it is possible to entertain more than one
thought on the basis of one and the same intuitive act. And
which thought the subject comes to entertain also depends
on factors such as the subject’s attention or other
preoccupations.13 If, however, the thought the subject is
entertaining is about a while he is intuiting a, then the
thought is immediately accepted (as true). Now due to the
natural cognitive situation it is not possible that someone
who judges evidently that a exists while intuiting a would
not be ready to judge that a is present (to him), since he can
only judge evidently that a exists in the very presence of
a. We rarely—if ever—acknowledge the mere existence of
a thing (‘this thing exists’).14 On some occasions, however,
we do state a thing’s being present (to us), that is, its being
‘here and now’.15 Consider the following scenario. Look-
ing for her glasses, Anne (in the kitchen) asks Peter (in the
living room): ‘Can you spot my glasses?’ And Peter, seeing
(‘intuiting’) the glasses on the table, answers, ‘Yes, they
are here.’ This case of an existential judgement seems to be
a fairly natural one. And it seems that Ockham has cases
such as these in mind when he speaks of natural affirmative
evident judgements about things. Thus:
(2) If a subject S judges evidently that a exists while
intuiting a in the presence of a, then S is ready to
judge evidently that a is here or that a is present.16
It is important to keep this in mind when it comes to
supernaturally induced ‘affirmative’ judgements, since in
the supernatural case, the subject is not ready to judge that
the thing is present or that it is here.
Speaking in terms of causal powers, everything present to a
subject can act on him as a cause of an intuitive act. Therefore,
the complete cause of an intuition can be rather complex, e.g.
if several things causally act on a subject simultaneously. This
is even the case where there is apparently only one thing, such
as a sculpture, in a room.According toOckham, there are only
particular things and everything that exists or can exist is
either a substance (Socrates, this rook) or a quality of a
10 ‘Unde propter similitudinem non plus dicitur intuitiva propria
cognitio singularis quam abstractiva prima, sed solum propter
causalitatem, […]’ Quodl. I, q.13 (OTh IX, 76). Ockham’s point
here is that intuition is a genuine singular cognition due to its acts
being individuated by their singular causes; intuition is not singular
because an intuitive cognition would be a representation of just one
particular. For a discussion of the representational function of
‘similitude’ or ‘likeness’ see Panaccio (2004: 119–144).
11 I owe this formulation to Wolfgang Ku¨nne. See Ku¨nne (1995:
370).
12 Rep. II, qq.12–13, (OTh V, 284).
13 Ockham also states that the forming of such a thought ‘can only
occur by means of the will’. Ord. I, dist.3, 1.4 (OTh II, 438). I do not
take this to mean that it is totally ‘up to the subject’ to choose which
thought to entertain. The point is that there are several factors that
determine the ‘forming’ of a thought, of which some might be ‘up to
the subject’, whereas others are not. For a discussion of these factors
see Schierbaum (2014: 209–212).
14 Carl stresses the redundancy of propositions of the form ‘This is an
F’. He says: ‘Die Merkwu¨rdigkeit eines solchen Satzes ergibt sich
daraus, dass es vo¨llig u¨berflu¨ssig ist, etwa im Anblick einer
bestimmten Person zu sagen, sie existiere. Denn, gegeben gewisse
Umsta¨nde, so ist diese Situation die Situation, in der die Wahrheit
dieses Satzes offenkundig ist, und die Behauptung dieses Satzes daher
u¨berflu¨ssig ist.’ Carl (1974: 187, fn.14).
15 The presence of a thing implies its existence, but the reverse, of
course, does not hold.
16 I decided to render the forms of the judgement about a thing’s
presence in this way because they are quite natural in English. The
two forms should cover all cases in which something is present to the
judging subject, that is, ‘demonstratively’ locatable in space and/or
time (‘here and now’). The copula ‘is’ here is a further indexical
element referring to the present time (‘now’).
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substance (Socrates’ being wise, the rook’s being black).17
Normally, it is not possible to intuit a substance without at
least some of its qualities.18 For instance, when I intuit a rook
in plain daylight etc., then I also intuit some its qualities such
as the black colour of its feathers. For this reason, it is possible
to evidently judge about one and the same things in different
respects on the basis of one and the same intuitive act. In a
passage immediately subsequent to the very introduction of
intuition Ockham writes:
Similarly, intuitive cognition is such that when certain
things are cognized and one of them (I) inheres in
another or (II) is located in a different place to another
or (III) relates to another thing in any other way, then it
is known immediately by virtue of the non-complex
cognition of these things whether (I’) the thing inheres
(in another thing) or not, whether (II’) it is located in a
different place or not, and (III’) the same applies with
respect to any other contingent truth […].19
We can generalize three forms of what can be evidently
judged—affirmatively or negatively—on the basis of natural
intuition. As we saw earlier, it is possible to judge about a
thing’s being present on the basis of an intuition of that thing.
The form of this judgement can be rendered as follows:
(A) a is (not) here.20
A judgement about one thing inhering in another—(I’) in
the quotation—can be of the following form:
(B) a is (not) F.
Lastly, (II’) and (III’), that is, judgements about things
standing in a spatial relation or in another kind of relation
to each other can be of the following form:
(C) a (not)R b.
It should have become clear that due to the referential
complexity of intuition, what can be evidently judged also
covers different aspects of the thing or things intuited and
thus, can take different forms.
Now what exactly does it mean that ‘by virtue of’ the
intuition a subject can evidently judge about the things
intuited in different respects? The relation thereby
expressed is, again, nothing but a causal relation: the
intuition of a causes the act of evidently judging that
a exists. In the natural affirmative case, the intuition of a
thing, say, a rook causes the act of judging that the rook
exists in conjunction with the rook itself. The intuition is
only a partial cause of the judgement, the rook acting as
another cause of the act of judging evidently that the rook
exists. One could also say that the rook’s causal contribu-
tion to the judgement is indirect insofar as it directly causes
the intuition of the rook which, in turn, directly causes the
judgement. The natural act of judging that a exists and the
supernatural act of judging that a does not exist differ in the
composition of their respective cause. The underlying idea
is that something in conjunction with something else can
cause an effect opposite to the one it would produce by
itself. Ockham writes:
It is not contradictory that some cause in connection
with another partial cause causes some effect, but that
the former without the other partial cause produces
the opposite effect. […] I concede that the cause of
these judgements [that the thing exists or that it does
not exist] is not the same, because the cause of the
one [that the thing does not exist] is the cognition
without the thing, and the cause of the other [that the
thing exists] is the cognition along with the thing as a
partial cause.21
It is possible to reconstruct the following causal chain in
the natural affirmative case: First, a thing a causes an
intuition of a within a subject, and then a and the intuition
of a jointly cause the evident act of judging that a exists. In
the supernatural negative case, the—supernaturally sus-
tained—intuition of a (without a) causes the evident act of
judging that a does not exist. This is the ‘opposite effect’
insofar as what is judged in this case (‘that a does not
exist’) and what is judged in the former case (‘that
a exists’) are contradictory. I discuss the supernatural
negative case in some detail later.22
Natural affirmative cases taking one of the forms of
(B) or (C) can be described analogously to the former
causal chain.23 Let us briefly review them. As to (B), by
naturally intuiting a rook, Anne normally intuits also some
of the rook’s qualities (its blackness for instance), such that
she is able to evidently judge that (B) the rook is black.24
17 ‘[…] quia nulla res est quin sit substantia vel accidens; […].’
Summa Logicae [hereafter: SL] I, 38 (OPh I, 108).
18 For the ease of exposition, I leave aside the complication that for
Ockham we have direct cognitive access by intuition only to
accidents, but not to substances. In some passages he explicitly
states that we come to have a cognition of substances via the intuition
of their accidents: Rep. IV, q.2, (OTh VII, 23): ‘[…] per cognitionem
intuitivam alicuius accidentis absoluti devenitur in cognitionem
subiecti, puta quod ibi est subiectum sustentans accidens […]’
According to this view, then, it is not naturally possible to intuit a
particular substance (Socrates) without at least some of its accidents.
19 Ord. I, prol., q.1 (OTh I, 31). It is immediately subsequent to the
quote in fn. 5.
20 The judgement could also be of the form ‘a is (not) present’. See
fn.16.
21 Ord. I, prol., q.1 (OTh I, 71).
22 See Sect. 3.2.
23 (B) a is (not) F, (C) a (not)R b.




Put differently, it is necessary to intuit a thing together with
one of its qualities in order to evidently judge that that
thing is thus-and-so. As to (C), Anne can also judge about
for instance the rook’s spatial relation to other things. For
instance, she can judge that the rook is on the roof. Just as
it is necessary to intuit a in order to evidently judge that
a is here it is necessary to have an intuition of two things
a and b in order to evidently judge that a relates to b in a
certain way. For instance, Anne can evidently judge that the
two halves of the cheesecake are equal only if she intuits
both halves of the cake simultaneously. The following
diagram can be given for affirmative natural evident
judgements.25 The decisive point is that the causal relations
obtain simultaneously. Thus:
This illustrates that the intuition of a—together with a—
causes the act of judging correctly about what is thought in
the very presence of a. Which of the possible thoughts are
entertained depends on the subject’s attention and preoc-
cupation. Now does this diagram also apply if what is
judged is of one of the three negative forms?
2.2 The Natural Negative Cases
One of the rare examples Ockham actually gives of such a
case is the following:
[…] for instance, if I see simultaneously a whiteness
and a blackness in one single act of intellectual
cognition, and then I form this complex ‘[the] white
[thing] is not black’ (‘album non est nigrum’) by
means of this intuitive cognition, I have only two
acts: one intuitive [act] aimed at the whiteness and
the blackness and another complex [act] […] that is
aimed at the copula and the terms negatively.26
Several remarks are in place here. First: In this passage,
Ockham is primarily concerned with the question of how
many acts are involved in the ‘forming’ of such a thought
(a ‘complex’). Therefore, he does not repeat that if this
kind of thought is ‘formed’ while intuiting both something
white and something black it is at once accepted as true.
Second, it becomes clear once more that more than one
thing can be intuited in one intuitive act, where the intuitive
act is distinct from the entertaining of a thought about the
things intuited. In Ockham’s example, the subject evidently
judges that
(I) [the] white thing is not black.27
On the same cognitive basis, the subject could also judge
that
(II) [this] whiteness is not identical to [this] blackness.
Again, it might depend on the subject’s preoccupation and
attention on which of the aspects of what is intuited he
focuses: whether he focuses on the qualities as particulars
while neglecting the substance having the quality or whe-
ther he focuses on just this relation of a substance to its
qualities. More generally, it should also be possible to
judge evidently that one particular is not related to another
particular in a certain way while intuiting both particulars
at once. (See (C) above).
Suppose that what is judged is of the form ‘a is not here’
(see (A) above)? The problem is that in the natural case,
there simply is no intuition of a, if a is not present. I would
like to apply here Fred Dretske’s idea that—at least with
respect to some relations, especially spatial ones—it is
possible to see in a primary epistemic way that one par-
ticular is not related to another particular in a certain way
by seeing only one of them.28 This, of course, presupposes
that the subject has some notion of the particular he has no
intuition of. Ockham distinguishes another kind of singular
cognition from intuition, namely the so-called abstractive
cognition. By abstractive cognition, Ockham explains a
subject’s ability to think about a particular in its absence,
25 The arrow ‘?’ here denotes a causal relation: it is to be read
‘causes’. ‘I (a)’ reads ‘intuition of a’. Of course, what is judged could
also take the form ‘a is here’ or simply ‘a exists’.
26 Rep. II, qq.12–13 (OTh V, 280–281). (Italics mine).
27 One might wonder why Ockham first says that two qualities
‘whiteness’ (albedo) and ‘blackness’ (nigredo) are intuited, but then
speaks of something white (album) and something black (nigrum).
The semantically relevant difference is that a term such as ‘white-
ness’, as a so-called ‘absolute term’, can stand (‘supposit’) within a
proposition for all and only the things it signifies, that is, for
particularized qualities of ‘whiteness’, whereas a so-called connota-
tive term such as ‘white’ can stand within a proposition for the things
(the substances) having that quality, that is, for the things it
‘primarily’ signifies. ‘White’ secondarily signifies the quality of
whiteness. Ockham presents the distinction between absolute and
connotative terms in SL I, 10 (OPh I, 36). For discussion, see Panaccio
(2004: 64–83) and Schierbaum (2014: 21–37).
28 See Dretske (1969: 151–152). I think the adaption of one of
Dretske’s cases here is sufficiently justified by the fact that his basic
conception of primary epistemic seeing that something is the case
bears important similarities to Ockham’s conception of evident
judgements based on intuition. Dretske’s basic idea is that there are
cases where a subject can be said to see that a thing a is P by seeing
a itself, where ‘P’ is a non-relational predicate. See ibid., p. 78.
Dretske describes this as a situation where knowledge is acquired by
visual means. Ibid., p. 80. Analogously, Ockham could say that by
intuiting things in their very presence, one can acquire knowledge
about them and their properties. Adapting Dretske’s solution for
‘negative cases’ indicates an elegant way of dealing with cases
Ockham does not address himself directly while respecting his overall
conception.
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that is, after it has been intuited by him. If I once had an
intuition of Socrates, then if he is no longer present to me, I
can think of him nevertheless, because, as Ockham says,
I saw him with such a shape, color, of such a height,
breadth, and in such a place; and by this composite
conception (conceptum compositum) I remember that
I saw Socrates.29
This ‘abstractive cognition’ of a particular—other than the
intuition of it—is composite. This means that it has
(conceptual) parts. These can be rendered explicit by way
of a description of the thing.30 Most importantly, this
singular abstractive cognition differs from intuition in that
only intuition, but not abstractive cognition has the power
of (partially) causing an evident act of judging about a
thing’s existence or its presently being thus-and-so.
Abstractive cognition has no such causal powers. Ockham
characterizes abstractive cognition as follows:
Abstractive cognition is that cognition by means of
which it cannot be known of a contingent thing
whether it exists or not. And in this way abstractive
cognition abstracts from existence and non-existence,
since neither can one evidently know by means of it
that a thing exists when it exists nor that it does not
exist when it does not, as opposed to intuitive
cognition.31
I would like to adapt one of Dretske’s examples
according to which it is possible to see in a primary
epistemic way that a particular person is not in her room
just by seeing either the person (without her room) or her
room (without the person) to Ockham’s conception.
Consider Anne and Peter again. Suppose Anne is able
to think of Peter in his absence because she intuited him
many times such that she also acquired some singular
‘abstractive conception’ of him.32 Now in her search for
Peter, Anne intuits the living room, but not Peter. Her
intuition does not include Peter. One could say that her
focus of attention is shaped by her preoccupation of
finding Peter. Therefore she is willing to pay special
attention to any Peter-like-aspect of her intuition. It is
plausible that if Anne now thinks that
(III) Peter is not here,
she cannot but accept this thought as true because she has
an intuition of the living room to which she refers to as
‘here’ while lacking an intuition of Peter at the same time.
Put differently, her thought is partly based on the intuition
of the living room and partly on her abstractive cognition
of Peter.
One might worry that the involvement of abstractive
cognition in this case changes things, and even radi-
cally.33 But in what respect? Of course, Anne could
certainly not entertain the thought that Peter is not here
without having some abstractive cognition of Peter.
However, I see no reason why the causal powers of the
abstractive cognition could change the overall causal
picture sketched so far—simply because abstractive cog-
nition, as noted before, altogether lacks causal powers
with respect to the present-tense evident judgements dis-
cussed here. Abstractive cognition is relevant as to the
content of the judgement; but since it is possible to think
that a is thus-and-so on the sole basis of abstractive
cognition, but not to evidently judge that a is thus-and-so
on that basis, abstractive cognition, in this respect at least,
is causally irrelevant.
In other words, I think there is no reason to suppose that
in this case, the intuition of the living room could not be a
(partial) cause of the evident judgement that Peter is not
here (in the living room).34 If this is plausible, it can be
held in general that if a subject has an intuition of a (or of
b) but merely an abstractive cognition of b (or of a), then
what he can evidently judge about a (or a and b) can be of
one of the negative forms:
(A) a is not here.
(B) a is not F.
(C) a notR b.
29 Quodl. I, q.13 (OTh IX, 77).
30 To avoid confusion: An act of intuition is not composite, but
simple according to Ockham, because it does not contain other acts as
parts. That is, the (possible) complexity of the complete cause of an
intuition does not imply the (structural) complexity of the intuitive
act.
31 ‘Notitia autem abstractiva est illa virtute cuius de re contingente
non potest sciri evidenter utrum sit vel non sit. Et per istum modum
notitia abstractiva abstrahit ab exsistentia et non exsistentia, quia nec
per ipsam potest evidenter sciri de re existente quod exsistit, nec de
non existente quod non exsistit, per oppositum ad notitiam intuiti-
vam.’ Ord. I, prol., q.1 (OTh I, 32).
32 That she has some such notion of Peter might become apparent by
the fact that she is able to give a description of Peter including the
way he looks, moves, talks and so on. At this point, it can remain open
what this description exactly includes. Of course, Anne’s abstractive
singular notion of Peter can differ (and even strongly) from the
abstractive notion another person might have of Peter.
33 I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for articulating this worry.
34 As the same reviewer also points out, it is true that Ockham
himself, at least to my knowledge, does not explicitly discuss such a
case. Nonetheless, though, I see no reason why this analysis should
contradict anything in Ockham’s theory. In other words, Ockham
holds that intuitive acts can be combined with other non-intuitive acts,
and in a variety of ways. As a matter of fact, any complex mental act
has non-complex acts as its parts of which intuition can be one. See
Ord. I, prol., q.1 (OTh I, 16–18). Panaccio discusses another telling
example in Panaccio (2004: 14). The point, as I see it, is that only




The diagram can be adjusted as follows to the case of
natural negative evident judgement:35
It should have become clear that the fact that certain
thoughts about absent things involve abstractive cognition
in Ockham’s picture does not affect the point that in the
‘negative’ cases discussed here the naturally induced
intuition of a thing or things causes evident judgements.36
These acts of judging occur by wholly natural means. I now
turn to the supernatural cases.
3 Intuition and Evident Judgement: The
Supernatural Paradigm
3.1 The Supernatural Negative Case
Recall that Ockham introduces the possibility of acquiring
evident knowledge about a thing’s existence along with
the—exclusively supernatural—possibility of acquiring
such knowledge about a thing’s non-existence. For this
reason, I start the exposition of the supernatural paradigm
with the negative case. I quote again the relevant passage:
[…] the intuitive cognition of a thing is such a cog-
nition by virtue of which it can be known whether a
thing exists or not, such that if the thing exists, the
intellect judges immediately that it exists and evi-
dently recognizes that it exists, […]. And in the same
way, if by divine power such a […] cognition of a
non-existent thing were to be preserved, then by
virtue of this non-complex cognition the intellect
would evidently cognize that this thing does not
exist.37
In the supernatural case described here, the intuitive act
is attainable only by divine intervention, since the thing
does not exist. The idea, as indicated above, is that the—
supernaturally sustained—intuition of a (without a) causes
the evident judgement that a does not exist.38 I suggest
thinking of the conditional—if […] a […] cognition of a
non-existent […] were to be preserved, then […] the
intellect would evidently cognize that this thing does not
exist—in the sense of a (true) counterfactual conditional. In
the Latin text, Ockham uses subjunctive forms of the
imperfect (esset, cognosceret). This indicates that he takes
the content of the antecedent as quite exceptional, or
contrary to the ordinary course of the world.39
Two metaphysical principles apply here. Both are rela-
ted to divine omnipotence. The first concerns replaceability
of any efficient cause by God.40 The second relates to the
ontological separability of any two distinct things (res
absolutae). According to Panaccio and Piche´, these two
principles illustrate what it amounts to that God’s power be
restricted only by what is contradictory.41 Applying the
first principle to intuition, it means that God can act as a
cause in place of any particular a and cause an intuition of
a within the subject directly—even though a might not
exist.42 Note that Ockham speaks of the ‘preservation’ of
such an intuitive cognition in this case. Medieval authors
distinguish between the (initial) causation of an effect and
the preservation of that effect by its cause. For instance, the
natural intuition of a rook is not only initially caused, but
also sustained by the rook. If the rook is no longer present
to the subject and thus, cannot sustain the intuition further,
the intuition of the rook ceases to exist—unless God were
to replace the rook as a cause such that the intuition would
be sustained further. This suggests that in his introduction
of the intuition of non-existents, Ockham has in mind the
case where the thing no longer exists. Applying now the
second principle, the point is that God can replace a as a
cause only because a and the intuition of a are ‘really’
distinct. Two things are distinct in this sense if and only if
the one can exist without the other. Ockham specifies this a
little further by stating that
[…] an intuitive vision, […] is an absolute thing
distinct in place and subject from the object that is
A (b) 
¦




35 I use the broken line to indicate that the ‘forming’ of the thought
presupposes some abstractive cognition of b, noted as ‘A (b)’, without
implying a causal relation between the abstractive cognition and the
act of judging evidently that b is not here.
36 Again, what is thus judged could also take one of the two other
forms distinguished in Sect. 2.1.
37 Ord. I., prol., q.1 (OTh 1, 31), (italics mine). See above, Sect. 2.1,
first quote.
38 See Sect. 2.1 above.
39 To my knowledge, this is Ockham’s standard practice as regards
the use of subjunctive forms in conditionals.
40 ‘[…] ‘quidquid Deus producit mediantibus causis secundis, potest
immediate sine illis producere et conservare’.’ Quodl. VI, q. 6 (OTh
IX, 604–605). ‘Secondary causes’ are nothing but ‘natural’ efficient
causes, the point being that God is the primary cause of everything.
See Rep. II, q. 3 (OTh V, 60). ‘[…] Deus est causa prima et
immediata omnium quae producuntur a causas secundis.’.
41 On the motivational role of these principles for Ockham’s
development of the doctrine of the intuition of non-existents see
Panaccio and Piche´ (2010: 102–105).
42 ‘[…] sed in notititiam intuitivam corporalem potest mediante
obiecto; igitur potest in eam immediate per se.’ Quodl. VI, q. 6 (OTh
IX, 605).
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seen; therefore the vision [of a star] can remain while
the star is destroyed.43
There seem to be two criteria for distinctness: (a) difference
in place and (b) difference in subject. The former should be
clear: if a and b are not in the same place (at the same
time), then a and b are distinct. What about (b)? A quality,
as an absolute thing, inheres in a subject, without being
itself a subject of further qualities. A substance, by
contrast, is itself a subject of qualities. Thus if a and
b are either not qualities of the same subject or if a and
b are not the same substance, then a and b are distinct. An
intuitive act and its object are distinct in both respects: they
are (a) locally distinct and (b) distinct as to their subject:
the intuitive act is a quality of the ‘cognizing’ substance
whereas the thing intuited is either itself a substance or a
quality of the ‘cognized’ substance.44 Modifying (1) above,
it can be said that45
(1a) if a thing a causes an intuition of a in a subject S,
then (A) S intuitsn a as long as the intuition of a in S
is sustained by a or (B) S intuitssn a as long as the
intuition of a in S is supernaturally sustained by God
(where a is either absent or has ceased to exist).46
It is crucial that the naturally and the supernaturally
sustained intuitive acts differ as to their causal powers with
respect to evident judgements. Whereas in the natural,
affirmative case, the intuition of a together with a causes an
evident act of judging if what is thought is affirmative (See
DIAGRAM 1 above), the supernatural negative case can
be rendered as follows:
Here the limits of God’s power become apparent: to
judge that a exists when a does not exist would be con-
tradictory. Such an act of judging could not be evident,
since by definition, an evident act implies the truth of what
is thus judged. Therefore, Ockham could argue, God can
only replace the non-existent thing as a cause of an act of
intuition, but he cannot replace the thing as a cause in the
production of the act of judging, if what is judged is that
the thing exists. This applies only to evident judgement, not
intuitive cognition. In other words, not every cause is
replaceable in every respect in view of the limits of divine
power: a particular a is replaceable in every situation with
respect to its ‘immediate’ power to cause an act of intuition
within a subject, but it is not replaceable in every situation
with respect to its ‘mediate’ power to cause an evident act
of judging. By natural means, it is not at all possible to
evidently judge that a thing does not exist, since it is not
possible to have an intuition of a thing that does not exist at
present. Taking into account the distinction between initial
causation and preservation, there are four possible combi-
nations of naturally and supernaturally induced intuitive
acts47:
Case (1) was discussed in Sect. 2.1: a thing a naturally
causes and preserves an intuition as long as it is present to
the subject. Case (2) was discussed in this section: the
intuition of a thing is naturally caused by a, but supernat-
urally sustained by God. I now turn to the supernatural
affirmative case, case (3).48
God
↓




INTUITION of a particular a
initial causation preservation  
1. natural natural
2. natural supernatural
3. supernatural supernatural 
4. supernatural natural
43 Ord. I., prol., q.1, (OTh 1, 39).
44 Things are complicated by the fact that Ockham also seems to
admit of the possibility of intuiting one’s own mental acts. Ord. I,
prol., q.1 (OTh I, 39–44). If, however, it is correct to say that two
mental acts inhere in the same subject, that is, the same intellective
soul then they are not distinct with respect to (b). See McCord Adams
(2001) and Perler (2010) for an account of Ockham’s model of the
soul.
45 By ‘intuitsn’ I mean ‘intuits naturally’ and ‘intuitssn’ means ‘intuits
supernaturally’.
46 Apparently, Ockham is committed to the view that there are (and
even only) particular possible things. In both cases the subject is said
to have an intuition of a—even if a does not exist. In that case, the
subject must have an intuition of a possible particular thing, namely a,
otherwise, the intuition would simply be of nothing. Cf. Panaccio and
Piche´ (2010: 101). What further supports the assumption that intuition
is restricted to things both actual and possible is this: according to
Ockham, there is no intuition of impossible things such as the
chimera. ‘[…] dico quod contradictio est quod visio sit, et tamen quod
illud quod videtur non sit in effectu nec esse possit. Ideo contradictio
est quod chimaera videatur intuitive, sed non est contradictio quod
illud quod videtur nihil sit in actu extra causam suam, dummodo
possit esse in effectu vel aliquando fuit in rerum naturam.’ Quodl. VI,
q.7 (OTh IX, 606–607).
47 Ockham discusses cases (1) to (3) in Rep. II, qq.12–13 (OTh V,
258–261).
48 It should be noted that, according to Ockham’s theory, case (3)
may also include negative judgements: God could supernaturally
cause and preserve in my intellect the intuition of a thing that does
not exist, in which case I would judge correctly that this thing does
not exist. I thank one of the reviewers for pointing this out to me.
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3.2 The Supernatural Affirmative Case
In his Reportatio, Ockham presents a supernatural case
where the thing intuited exists without being present to the
subject. He writes:
[…] If God were to cause in me an intuitive cognition
of a thing existing in Rome, then I could judge that
the thing I am intuiting and seeing exists, on the basis
of the intuitive cognition of it, just as well as if that
cognition would be had naturally. If you say that this
object is neither presently here, nor sufficiently near,
I answer: although the intuitive cognition cannot be
caused naturally unless the object is present in some
determinate distance, it can be [caused] supernatu-
rally [in the absence of its object].49
As Ockham points out, a thing can act as a natural cause of
an intuition only if it is sufficiently near to the intuiting
subject. In this supernatural case, however, God causes an
intuition of a thing a (in Rome) within a subject being in
another city (in Hamburg, let’s say). That is, if God causes
in Anne (being in Hamburg) an intuition of the pope (being
in Rome), then this intuition causes Anne to judge
evidently that he (the pope) exists. Recall that in the
natural affirmative case, a subject judging evidently that
a exists in the presence of a is ready to judge evidently that
a is present or that a is here.50 This is not so in this
supernatural case. For one thing, it is simply not true that
the pope is present (to Anne). The question is whether
Anne is in a position to judge evidently about the pope’s
spatial position or his relation to other things at all. Above I
held that the natural cause of an intuitive act can be rather
complex, since everything present to a subject can exert its
causal powers in the production of one and the same
intuitive act.51 But here, God supernaturally produces the
intuition of exactly one thing in the subject, since he
replaces just one thing as a cause. It is a salient feature of
supernaturally induced intuition that a subject can intuit
one thing in total isolation, without even in relation to its
spatial position, if that thing exists. It is not contradictory
that God could cause an intuition of exactly one thing
within a subject, that is, without causing an intuition of the
thing’s actual position or in general, of the thing’s
surrounding. As Ockham emphasizes, it is not contradic-
tory that ‘a thing is seen without (the) situation, at least by
divine power […]’52
Why does the intuition of a (existing, but not present to
the subject) cause the subject to judge evidently that
a exists? Normally, a thing a does not only cause the
intuition of it in a subject, but a together with the intuition
of a causes the subject to judge evidently that a exists. If,
however, a exists, but is not present to the subject, then
a cannot naturally exert any of these two causal powers. If
a exists, but is not present to a subject, then God can
replace the object of intuition in both respects while
causing the intuition in the subject as well as the evident
judgement that a exists, if a exists. Again, one could say
that God causes the judgement indirectly insofar as he
directly causes the intuition of a, which in turn, directly
causes the judgement. God is able to do this because it is
not contradictory to judge that a exists if a exists. Only, this
is a judgement concerning merely the existence of a thing
without its presence. As such, it is not naturally attainable.
This case can be rendered as follows:53
In general, supernaturally induced intuition helps us to
determine the limits of what can be naturally and evidently
known—affirmatively and negatively—on the basis of
intuition. It is time to summarize.54
4 Conclusion
It became clear that according to Ockham, we are able to
make both affirmative and negative judgements by natural
intuition, just as we are by supernatural intuition. However,
it became also clear that these judgements differ as to what
exactly they are about: whereas naturally available evident
judgements include judgements about the presence or
absence of particulars and their presently being or not
being thus-and-so, the supernaturally available judgements
are about the mere existence or non-existence of things.
The latter do not broaden our existential knowledge as to
what we have a real chance to know; rather, they are rel-
evant in determining the limits of God’s power: God does
not have the power to cause incorrect judgements on the




49 Rep. II, qq.12–13 (OTh V, 258).
50 See (2) Sect. 2.1 above.
51 See Sect. 2.1.
52 Rep. II, qq.12–13 (OTh V, 284).
53 The broken line between ‘a’ and ‘God’ is meant to indicate that
a exists at such a distance that it cannot naturally exert its causal
powers on a subject.
54 I did not discuss case (4) here in which the initial causation of an
intuitive act is supernatural, and its preservation natural. Ockham, to
my knowledge, nowhere discusses this case. However, we could say
that in this case, the intuition of a (existing) is supernaturally caused
by God in a’s absence, but then the intuition is further sustained by
a (being present). First, the subject can evidently judge that a exists
(but not that it is present), and then, when the intuitive act is sustained
by a, the subject can judge that a is present.
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basis of supernaturally induced intuitions in us, since he
cannot replace the thing intuited as a (partial) cause of the
judgement that a exists, if a does not exist. In Ockham’s
picture, the divine power to replace any object with respect
to at least some of its causal powers should not be a mere
logical possibility: God can produce everything that is not
contradictory in this world, if he wants to, since he is a free,
not a necessary cause.55 Therefore, in Ockham’s view the
intuition both of non-existent and of existing-yet-absent
things is to be included in a complete and proper account of
the causal powers of intuition, although these two latter
cases are only conditional.
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